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CORRESPONDENCE 
The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-
Cost School of Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment 
James W. Bowers* 
We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism, and must re-
member that for our purposes our only interest in the past is for the 
light it throws upon the present. I look forward to a time when the 
part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very 
small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy 
on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for 
desiring them. As a step toward that ideal it seems to me that every 
lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics. The present 
divorce between the schools of political economy and law seems to 
me an evidence of how much progress in philosophical study still 
remains to be made. 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 1 
In two recently published articles,2 Wisconsin Law Professor Lynn 
LoPucki and Pennsylvania Law Professor Elizabeth Warren, nearly 
simultaneously, fired the latest shots in one of academia's hottest 
ongoing debates: whether any good reason for having bankruptcy law 
exists. 3 Justice Holmes once opined that the future belonged to the 
• Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. B.A. 1964, LL.B. 1967, 
Yale. - Ed. My thanks to John Church and Lucy McGough for helpful comments on earlier 
drafts. Credit for saving me from errors, but no blame for those remaining, is also due to Bob 
Rasmussen and Bruce Markell. Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren also graciously suggested 
improvements, some of which I made. They are obviously innocent of any sins that are left. 
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897). 
2. Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and 
Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of 
Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992). The text identifies these authors with the institutions 
with which they were affiliated at the time these articles were written. Professor LoPucki has 
subsequently joined the faculty of Washington University in St. Louis, and Professor Warren has 
joined the Harvard Law School faculty. 
3. The current debate began with Thomas M. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitle-
ments, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (arguing that state "grab-law" credi-
tors' remedies were inefficient, and that creditors would therefore agree ex ante to a collective 
remedy system resembling bankruptcy in order to overcome those inefficiencies). Douglas G. 
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986), fired the 
next salvo, arguing that the justification for bankruptcy law probably did not apply to publicly 
traded companies. This work elevated the matter to the state of a recognized debate by provok-
ing an exchange in the University of Chicago Law Review between Baird and Professor Elizabeth 
1773 
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lawyer skilled in statistics and economics.4 LoPucki and Warren ap-
parently agree about statistics but argue that, in a world with positive 
transaction costs, economic theory has little to contribute to our un-
derstanding about the justifications for bankruptcy law. 
I write to highlight what one might easily overlook in LoPucki's 
and Warren's pieces. As they assail the usefulness of economic analy-
sis, particularly analysis that begins by assuming zero transaction 
costs, they simultaneously inaugurate a new analytic tradition: the 
Fantastic Wisconsylvania School5 of Zero-Bureaucratic-Costs. They 
use their new theory to argue that markets are costly and thus are of 
limited or no use to people who want to take businesses apart or to 
reconfigure them. Corporate reorganizations, they urge, require the 
costless and perfectly functioning political appointee, the bankruptcy 
judge. The birth of this jurisprudential school is too significant to be 
permitted to pass unheralded. 
I. THE BANKRUPTCY DEBATE: THEORY AND DATA 
The bankruptcy debate, one of the few squabbles in academic com-
mercial law ever to have hit the newspapers, 6 is over whether chapter 
Warren. Compare Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987) (arguing 
that chapter 11 was intended to benefit workers and communities, and dismissing as irrelevant 
that it might be shown, in economic theory, to be costly for shareholders and creditors) with 
Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 
U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 815 (1987) (arguing that arguments like Warren's were too atheoretical to be 
helpful, and that bankruptcy should not be concerned with the redistributional policies favored 
by Warren). After at least one partial symposium, Symposium on the Law and Economics of 
Bargaining, 75 VA. L. R.Ev. 155 (1989), and several articles later in various journals, see, e.g., 
references cited infra notes 21 and 39, came a climactic point, at which the debate returned to the 
Yale Law Journal: Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter J J, 
101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992) (reporting an empirical study which claimed that the adoption of 
chapter 11 in 1978 had increased the bankruptcy losses suffered by corporate shareholders, and 
proposing that chapter 11 be repealed and replaced with a market system of contingent equity 
contracts). It is this piece that was the subject of the Warren and LoPucki articles. 
4. "For the rational study of law, the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the 
man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." Holmes, supra note I, at 
469. I am grateful to my erudite colleague Paul Baier for pointing out and then unearthing this 
and the introductory Holmes reference for me. 
5. Legal academia already boasts at least one famous "Wisconsin School," that of J. Willard 
Hurst, who championed the application of social science methods to the study of legal history. 
See Lawrence M. Friedman, American Legal History: Past and Present, in AMERICAN LA w AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 464, 465-67 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Shieber eds., 
1988). It is thus propitious that Warren reached so nearly simultaneously conclusions similar to 
LoPucki's, permitting their discovery to be named the Wisconsylvania School and eliminating 
the potential for confusion that might have arisen between "Wisconsin Schools" had LoPucki 
written alone. 
6. See, for example, Lopucki, supra note 2, at 80 nn.5 & 6 for citations to numerous articles 
in the financial press discussing the Bradley and Rosenzweig conclusions. Recently the debate 
has reached the popular press as well, even the front page of the New York Times. Peter Passell, 
Critics of Bankruptcy Law See Inefficiency and Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at Al. 
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11 of the Bankruptcy Code is justifiable. Michael Bradley and 
Michael Rosenzweig published an empirical study7 that compared the 
stock market value declines in the securities of firms taking bank-
ruptcy under chapters X and XI of the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act re-
gime8 with firms filing under the current chapter 11.9 The study was 
limited to companies whose securities were traded on major stock ex-
changes because there are no easily available, reliable data on the mar-
ket values of the securities of unlisted firms. 10 The study seems to 
show that shareholders are much worse off under the current law than 
under the former one. 
LoPucki and Warren critically scrutinize this study. 11 LoPucki ar-
gues that the theoretical model into which Bradley and Rosenzweig fit 
their data was inapposite because, among other things, it failed to dis-
criminate between losses due to the Bankruptcy Code and ordinary 
transaction costs incurred in recapitalizing businesses.12 He and War-
ren also question Bradley and Rosenzweig's analysis, arguing that the 
coming of the ·~unk bond" era made bankrupts in the two different 
time periods impossible to compare for purposes of making statistical 
inferences.13 Warren further insinuates, but does not show, that there 
7. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3. 
8. The Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978). 
9. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992)). 
10. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1058. 
11. I too am critical of certain aspects of the Bradley and Rosenzweig study. On one impor-
tant argument I agree with Warren and LoPucki that Bradley and Rosenzweig were unpersua-
sive. Bradley and Rosenzweig argue that the beneficiaries of chapter 11 were managers who were 
able, because of chapter 11, to extract wealth from the shareholders and bondholders of their 
firms. LoPucki and Warren analyze other studies on the fortunes of the managers of companies 
that took chapter 11 and show that other data contradicts Bradley and Rosenzweig's conclusion. 
See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 94-97; Warren, supra note 2, at 448-55. My shared criticism is 
based on theoretical rather than empirical grounds. If chapter 11 tended to give managers new 
ways of enriching themselves, and the market for management talent functioned minimally well, 
then the adoption of chapter 11 should have caused a decline in other forms of executive com-
pensation sufficient to make up for the new benefits chapter 11 confers on managers. Thus the 
values of the securities of the filing companies would not necessarily be affected by the adoption 
of chapter 11. I would therefore accept Bradley and Rosenzweig's conclusion that managers are 
winners only after learning what sort of defect they posit must exist in the labor market for 
managers which prevents such adjustments in executive wages. 
My disagreement with them does not undercut the validity of their ultimate conclusion that 
chapter 11 should be repealed. It may be that the losses they measure in their study are simply 
the dissipation of value that occurs in classic rent seeking when chapter 11 blurs the boundaries 
of everybody's property rights. See, for example, Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the 
Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. EcoN. REV. 291 (1974), and Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Cost of 
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. EcoN. J. 224 (1967), for the seminal rent-seeking literature. 
If rent seeking explains the losses, then nobody necessarily wins by the adoption of the new 
chapter 11. The bottom-line conclusion that chapter 11 should be repealed, however, is not 
undermined by a "nobody wins" thesis, even if a "managers win" thesis is partially discredited. 
12. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 84 n.17. 
13. Id. at 81; Warren, supra note 2, at 460-61. 
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may be hidden biases in the samples used by Bradley and Rosenzweig 
which make them nonrepresentative of the real world and cast doubt 
on the validity of the conclusions Bradley and Rosenzweig draw from 
them.t4 Because this part of LoPucki's and Warren's work does not 
advance their revolutionary new theory of zero-bureaucratic-costs, I 
will leave to Bradley and Rosenzweig the defense of their empirical 
model and statistical technique. ts 
LoPucki and Warren make three principal theoretical criticisms of 
the Bradley and Rosenzweig analysis which do invoke their new 
theory: 
1. The first, argued by LoPucki alone, is that the Bradley and Rosen-
zweig data, strictly speaking, only justify replacing chapter 11 
with chapters X and XI of the Chandler Act; 16 
2. The second, advocated by both, is that a showing of increased 
bankruptcy losses for publicly listed firms does not justify a repeal 
of the statute insofar as it applies to unlisted companies;t7 and 
3. Third, both argue that there are possible corporate stakeholders 
whose gains might outweigh the losses chapter 11 imposes on 
stockholders and bondholders.ts If so, one cannot justify repeal of 
chapter 11 by showing losses to those holding claims listed on 
public exchanges unless one can also show that the gains to these 
other, unexamined· stakeholders were less than the losses. 
In light of these observations, LoPucki concludes that Bradley and 
Rosenzweig's proposal to replace chapter 11 with a market system is 
not based on their empirical findings, but rather on their economic 
analysis of bankruptcy.t9 According to LoPucki, however, economic 
14. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 2, at 455-59. 
15. Bradley and Rosenzweig give a summary defense of their technique in Michael Bradley 
& Michael Rosenzweig, The Still Untenable Case for Chapter 11 (1993) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author). To deal with the claim that the chapter 11 firms were ·~unk 
bond" issuers unlike the chapter X and XI firms, and thus were systematically more highly 
leveraged, Bradley and Rosenzweig reran their comparisons on an even larger sample, holding 
leverage constant in their comparisons of pre- and post-1978 filing firms, and arrived at identical 
conclusions. 
16. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 97 n.66. 
17. Id.; Warren, supra note 2, at 444-46. 
18. LoPucki hypothesizes that creditors other than bondholders gain as much as the holders 
of those publicly traded claims lose. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 83 n.14, 94. Warren argues that 
chapter 11 was intended to redistribute debtors' wealth to multiple other parties. Warren, supra 
note 2, at 467-71. Since the claims of those other parties and creditors do not trade in active 
markets, however, this hypothesis is likely to be nearly untestable. Even if true, therefore, its 
truth must be accepted as a matter of faith. 
19. "It is on the basis of their nonempirical economic analysis that they conclude that court-
supervised bankruptcy reorganization should be eliminated entirely." LoPucki, supra note 2, at 
97-98. Warren would probably not disagree because she argues that the Bradley and Rosenzweig 
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analysis can never give meaningful, or even interesting,20 insights in 
the real world. He therefore concludes that the Bradley and Rosen-
zweig argument, lacking both empirical and theoretical support, is ut-
terly unfounded. Warren argues similarly that chapter 11 was 
adopted to replace market transactions because the use of markets en-
tails high costs.21 In the drawing of this conclusion and in its elabora-
tion, LoPucki and Warren inaugurate their revolutionary mode of 
analysis. Since the three critiques are pregnant with the tenets of the 
new Wisconsylvania School, it will be useful to examine them a bit 
more closely. 
A. The Pull of Positivism 
The Bradley and Rosenzweig study shows that a regime in which 
bankruptcy relief is easy to obtain creates more losses than a regime in 
which such relief is harder to obtain.22 Technically, Bradley and Ro-
senzweig admit, the direct conclusion to be drawn from this finding is 
that the current law ought to be repealed in favor of the former law.23 
However, making bankruptcy relief easier to obtain seems to increase 
conclusions should be limited to the cases they studied, which were all cases of listed companies. 
Warren, supra note 2, at 440. 
20. "Bradley & Rosenzweig's economic analysis of bankruptcy reorganization tells us more 
about economic analysis than about bankruptcy. The way problems melt away in this PM-ZTC 
[Perfect Markets-Zero Transaction Costs] World seems at first elegant, then suspicious, and fi-
nally boring." LoPucki, supra note 2, at 106. Strictly speaking, he may assume that there are 
several subsects of economic analysis and find boring only the sect which uses the concept of zero 
transaction costs as an analytical tool. LoPucki's work has nevertheless been consistently suspi-
cious of whether economic arguments can ever advance our understanding, whether or not such 
arguments were explicitly based on zero-transaction-cost models. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & 
William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, 
Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 183 (1990) (arguing that an a priori economic 
model of bankruptcy "cannot establish factually what the most efficient rule governing distribu-
tions in bankruptcy would be"). Warren has been critical of the contributions of economic anal-
ysis in the bankruptcy field before. See Warren, supra note 3. In the piece discussed in this 
correspondence, however, she limits her theoretical critique to an expression of skepticism over 
whether analyses which assume zero transaction costs are valid in a real world where such costs 
are positive. Warren, supra note 2, at 474-77. 
21. Warren, supra note 2, at 474-77. She does not address the theoretical reasons for believ-" 
ing that market systems encourage and permit institutions and behaviors that lower transaction 
costs and thus tend to produce optimally low-transaction-cost interactions among people. See, 
e.g., infra section 11.B. I have made this argument explicitly in connection with the nonban-
kruptcy law of creditors' remedies, showing that when investment in cost-saving technology is 
necessary in order to reduce transaction costs, the incentives generated by the nonbankruptcy 
creditors' remedy system are most apt to induce the appropriate investment. James W. Bowers, 
Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics 
of Lass Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 46-51 (1991). 
22. The primary effects of the new law are to make it easier for firms to seek bankruptcy 
relief and to consolidate the postbankruptcy control of the firm's management in the face of 
competing claims of creditors for the right to control the bankrupt firm's fortunes. See Bradley 
& Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1048. 
23. Id. at 1077 n.80. 
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bankruptcy losses, a fact from which one might also infer that chapter 
11 ought to be repealed entirely. The process of inference employed to 
arrive at this last conclusion is not, at least obviously, based on any 
economic analysis. It is as simple as drawing the following common 
sense conclusions: 
1. Premise: Less unpleasant states of the world are preferable to 
more unpleasant states. 
2. Data: I hate a regime in which you stick needles into my body for 
ten minutes more than one in which you stick them in for only 
two minutes. 
3. Strict Empirical Observation: The two-minute needle state of the 
world is better than the ten-minute state. 
4. Extended Inference: The best of all worlds is probably neither the 
two- nor the ten-minute state, but instead a third one in which you 
do not stick needles into me at all. 
LoPucki's first argument24 relies on the proposition that by itself data 
supports only a strict empirical observation but will not support any 
extended inferences so that, if you draw them, their source has to be 
some entirely extraneous theory.25 For his argument and my acu-
puncture hypothetical, we have trend data on only two regimes from 
which we drew a conclusion about a yet-to-be experienced third re-
gime. 26 Perhaps it is an inherent weakness in legal argument that law-
yers would recognize and even approve of this process of reasoning. It 
is probably true that many of Bradley and Rosenzweig's readers un-
derstood and agreed with this process of reasoning as a valid exercise 
in the drawing of inferences. True, it would be better to have had 
strict empirical observations of my actual preferences about the third 
regime prior to arriving at the extended inference.27 That there could 
be stronger empirical support for that inference is not, however, the 
same as saying that there is no support for it in the data. 
It is very difficult to obtain data which support strict empirical 
24. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
25. After reviewing a draft of this comment, LoPucki with great charm advised me that he is 
not skeptical of all possible extended inferences which would be drawn from Bradley and Rosen· 
zweig's data, but only of those that tend to undermine the justification for chapter 11. He enthu· 
siastically endorses any that tend to vindicate chapter 11. Indeed, as he pointed out to me, he has 
argued for at least three other interpretations of the data, each of which he considers to be a more 
plausible inference than that drawn by Bradley and Rosenzweig. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 94. 
26. By treating his argument skeptically, I do not mean to suggest that the extended infer· 
ence is not implied by the initial premise; the inference is heavily dependent on the theory em· 
bodied in that premise. I do contend, however, that the ultimate conclusion is, in common sense, 
also implied by the data. 
27. To negate, for example, the possibility that I have a minor masochistic preference for 
being poked with needles but only for time periods shorter than two minutes. 
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observations about prospective future states of affairs that have never 
existed. To demand that legal conclusions be based only on what can 
be proven by strict empirical observation, as LoPucki apparently does, 
is to carry the demands of positivistic methodology to an untenable 
extreme. Applying such standards creates large gaps between what we 
think we can know confidently and what we can actually know from 
proof. Among other things, the requirement outlaws all aspirational 
reasoning processes unless one aspires to some golden age in the past 
about which data might hypothetically be available. Those who aspire 
to futures that do not duplicate some golden era hold unjustifiable as-
pirations if only conclusions based on strict empirical observation 
alone can be justified. 
Not so "strictly speaking," we can draw the inference that Bradley 
and Rosenzweig drew without resort to any theory other than one 
which holds that regimes in which costs are low are preferable to re-
gimes in which costs are high. Indeed, I show below that the Fantas-
tic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost Model that drives the 
LoPucki and Warren critiques relies on this same preference hypothe-
sis. It might thus be argued that the Bradley and Rosenzweig conclu-
sion, insofar as it cannot be inferred directly from their data, is based 
on LoPucki's and Warren's hierarchy of values instead. It is doubtful 
that many of the arguments of any defender of chapter 11, including 
those of LoPucki and Warren, pass the test of being based only upon 
strict empirical observations. 
B. Stakeholders and Close Corporations: Markets and Values 
The second and third arguments that both Warren and LoPucki 
make are especially curious in light of LoPucki's first one. If one may 
not form valid conclusions from anything other than strict empirical 
observations of facts, LoPucki cannot know anything about the mar-
ket values of closely held corporations because nobody has reliable 
data about the value of claims to the assets of such firms. It follows 
that he can say to Bradley and Rosenzweig, "you do not know." He 
cannot say, "you are wrong." 
In the absence of empirical information about close corporations, 
whether Bradley and Rosenzweig can appropriately draw inferences 
about close corporations from data on publicly traded firms depends 
on whether extended inferences from empirical data are ever permissi-
ble and, if so, when. Answering these questions requires dealing criti-
cally with the differences between the anticipated behavior of 
financially troubled small businessmen, as opposed to big businessmen, 
in responding to the existence of creditors. Adoption of the strict em-
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pirical observation test is a slick way for LoPucki to relieve himself of 
the need to do this analysis.28 Similarly, without explicit data permit-
ting strict empirical observations, LoPucki cannot ever know whether 
other stakeholders such as nonbondholding creditors have gained or 
lost welfare as a result of the passage of chapter 11, and thus cannot 
validly criticize Bradley and Rosenzweig for ignoring them either. 
The difficulty is not only in the extent of our present knowledge, 
however. It is apparently LoPucki's position that whether chapter 11 
is justifiable is inevitably unknowable. Bradley and Rosenzweig are 
quite explicit that their study limited itself to companies whose securi-
ties were listed on major stock exchanges because hard information on 
market values was available only for those companies.29 The strict 
empirical observation limitation means that the impact of chapter 11 
on closely held corporations and on stakeholders whose claims do not 
trade in markets can never be knowable.30 It will thus never be possi-
ble either to justify the application of bankruptcy or to justify its re-
peal as it applies to such corporations or stakeholders unless either 
justification comes from a theory. This realization, when combined 
with LoPucki's succeeding argument in favor of having chapter 11 ap-
ply to close corporations and other stakeholders, leads to the insight 
that he is ignoring his own strict empirical observation restriction by 
employing a theory based on extended inference himself. That insight 
prompts this attempt to unearth the principles of his theory. 
28. Warren, on the other hand, lays out a taxonomy of differences that exist between listed 
and unlisted firms and then asserts that the existence of these differences "casts serious doubt on 
Bradley and Rosenzweig's claim that their data apply with equal force to all corporations." 
Warren, supra note 2, at 442-43. This stops just short of saying that nothing we know about 
listed corporations can ever serve as a basis for an extended inference about corporations gener-
ally, a position that comes close to insisting on strict empirical observation rigor. However, the 
tone of Warren's critique suggests that she might even be willing to infer that chapter 11 makes 
stockholders of close corporations better off from the fact that it makes holders of listed shares 
worse off because the types of firms are so different. Id. at 443. This position finesses the prob-
lem nearly as effectively as LoPucki's strict empirical observation requirement but, because it is 
itself an extended inference, also violates that requirement and thus makes ambiguous the extent 
to which Warren subscribes to LoPucki's standard of observational strictness. 
29. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1056 n.44. 
30. Recall that Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument and inference is that the adoption of 
chapter 11 caused the market values of certain claims against bankrupt firms to decline. Market 
values are direct evidence of the worth placed on rights to assets by actual, living buyers and 
sellers. There is much in LoPucki's argument, however, to suggest that he deems irrelevant what 
actual people are willing to take for or pay for rights. Instead, he suggests that the relevant 
datum is some transcendental sort of pure value. For example, LoPucki suggests that market 
values might somehow be incorrect, and that markets might "overvalue" corporate shares. 
LoPucki, supra note 2, at 83 n.13. At the same time, however, he also suggests that the problem 
of determining nonmarket values is intractable. Id. at 84 & n.18. 
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II. MARKETS AND BUREAUCRACIES 
A. Aspirations and Economic Models 
The meat of the Warren and LoPucki commentary on the Bradley 
and Rosenzweig study is their attack on economic theory, upon which 
LoPucki and Warren claim Bradley and Rosenzweig's conclusions 
must have been based.31 The problem, LoPucki asserts, is "the econo-
mist's hypothetical world of perfect markets and zero transaction costs 
... the PM-ZTC World. "32 LoPucki and Warren both argue that the 
distance between this assumed world and the real world in which we 
live is so great that conclusions about the former are simply irrelevant 
to the lives of people living in the latter.33 This argument flies in the 
face of a long human tradition of insisting that good can come from 
contemplating heaven, if for no other reason than to better the odds 
that we can get there. 
The LoPucki and Warren dismissal of the observation technique of 
economic analysis, presumably to be replaced by strict information 
about the real world, marks them as adherents to what Holmes called 
"antiquarianism."34 LoPucki and Warren reject, and Bradley and Ro-
31. See supra note 19. If the Bradley and Rosenzweig proposals are as unrelated to their 
empirical work and as dependent upon their economic theory, as LoPucki and Warren argue, 
one might wonder why they spent so much energy criticizing Bradley and Rosenzweig's empiri-
cal technique. If they believe that the Bradley and Rosenzweig theory is required to reach their 
conclusions and that it is indefensible, their empirical critiques were a waste of time. The empiri-
cal critiques also tend, unfortunately, to divert our focus from LoPucki's and Warren's own 
theoretical contributions to the debate. 
32. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 99. Actually, his characterization of the hypothetical world 
economic analysts use is potentially redundant. If the set of costs considered to be transaction 
costs is defined broadly enough, ZTC alone is all it is necessary to assume. The existence of 
universal and utterly perfect markets follows from the assumption of. ZTC. See generally Guido 
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules - A Comment, 11 J.L. & 
EcoN. 67 (1968). If transaction costs are more narrowly defined, recent work in game theory 
suggests that ZTC may not inevitably lead to perfect market outcomes. See, e.g., Jason S. John-
ston, Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining far Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 
WASH. U. L.Q. 291 (1992). 
33. As yet, no one has demonstrated that any relationship at all exists between the way 
things work in the PM-ZTC World and the way things work in the world in which we live. 
No basis exists for assuming that, because a proposition is entirely true in the former world, 
it is even a little bit true in the latter. To prove a necessary premise of an argument false is 
to defeat the argument. By that standard, all arguments that depend on PM-ZTC assump-
tions fail, as do all attempts to import conclusions from the PM-ZTC world. 
LoPucki, supra note 2, at 109. "Unfortunately, we live in an imperfect world. Economists have 
long recognized that solutions proposed for perfect markets may not work in imperfect markets." 
Warren, supra note 2, at 474. 
34. See supra note 1. Taken together with his insistence that conclusions be based only on 
strict empirical observation, LoPucki argues that the only sound basis for making policy judg-
ments is valid empirical data. Warren too has fervently insisted that all bankruptcy arguments 
must be based on solid empirical data. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Use of Empirical 
Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 195. These 
positions are "antiquarian" because data are always explicitly historical. 
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senzweig accept, Holmes' call for us to "spend our energy on a study 
of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them."35 
The Coase Theorem,36 application of which inaugurated the use of 
ZTC models, posits the ZTC world as one of aspiration. The ZTC 
world is the one in which the most is made out of the world's scarce 
resources. In all other worlds, scarce resources might be wasted while 
. some people are still hungry. In their model Bradley and Rosenzweig 
propose that the law be altered to mimic more closely the outcomes in 
a ZTC world. LoPucki and Warren, however, reject as nonsensical 
the use of a ZTC world even as an aspiration. 37 This is particularly 
ironic because it appears that, upon close examination of their argu-
ment, LoPucki and Warren seem devoted to the lowering of transac-
tion costs as justification for their own legal arguments. 38 What is 
significant and important about their analysis, and promising about 
the Fantastic Wisconsylvania School of Zero-Bureaucratic-Costs 
(ZBC), is that defenders of the Bankruptcy Code have, for the first 
time, offered a coherent principle to justify its existence. If bankruptcy 
law lowers transaction costs, it has a lot going for it that has never 
been previously realized.39 Regrettably, neither LoPucki's nor War-
ren's application of the ZBC model takes serious analytical account of 
transaction costs. 
35. See supra note 1. 
36. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). 
37. See supra note 33. ZTC models are "boring" to LoPucki because, in a world of ZTC, 
every new proposal does maximize wealth. See LoPucki, supra note 20. LoPucki's boredom, 
however, results from a misapplication of the Coase Theorem. The theorem actually suggests 
that things tum out right only when the parties have the right to contract around any imperfec· 
tions. Inasmuch as he acknowledges that the right to take chapter 11 cannot be contracted 
around, LoPucki, supra note 2, at 107 n.123, an actual world of very low or nonexistent transac-
tion costs ought still to retain some intrinsically interesting legal problems. 
38. "Chapter 11 exists solely to deal with transaction costs." LoPucki, supra note 2, at 106. 
"Bradley and Rosenzweig argue that bankruptcy is justifiable only if there are problems gener-
ated by 'significant .•. transactions costs' .... In my view, Chapter 11 was specifically designed 
to respond to such problems." Warren, supra note 2, at 475. 
One way of making the world mimic one in which costs are zero is, of course, to alter the 
existing world in ways that reduce costs as near to zero as is practical. 
39. Warren explicitly uses the argument that bankruptcy lowers transaction costs. Warren, 
supra note 2, at 475. 
My own work expresses some skepticism that transaction costs can justify or explain the 
existence of bankruptcy, although I do try to explain the existence and shape of nonbankruptcy 
creditors' remedies as functions of the existence of transaction costs. James W. Bowers, Groping 
and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics 
of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990) (arguing that debtors are the most efficient liquidators 
of their own declining affairs even in the presence of identified transaction costs); Bowers, supra 
note 21 (arguing that debtors are the most efficient distributors of their own assets, even in the 
face of identified transaction costs). 
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B. The Transaction Costs Avoided by Bankruptcies 
The heart of LoPucki's argument is not a systematic attempt to 
discredit economic reasoning, but rather an argument by example. He 
posits that there are four types of transaction costs in the real world 
which are ignored by Bradley and Rosenzweig's proposal to jettison 
chapter 11. While he never explicitly says so, it is apparent that, in the 
end, LoPucki must make his own "economic" analysis and base it 
firmly on the second classic model which earned Coase the Nobel 
Prize. 40 If the market fails to be efficient, Coase argued, a command-
type governance structure could be justified, assuming that the costs 
imposed by failures inherent in command structures are not more seri-
ous than those imposed by failures of the market. 41 LoPucki never 
even asks whether, in order to defend bankruptcy law, one must do 
anything more than assert that the world has transaction costs. 
Rather than face the question of whether bankruptcy has costs of its 
own that might exceed the market's transaction costs, he has taken the 
easier route of assuming that command structures entail zero bureau-
cratic costs. Thus, if one can demonstrate that markets impose trans-
action costs on people, one can easily justify chapter 11 because, 
unlike markets, it operates perfectly and costlessly. Voila ZBC! 
Warren's view may not be quite as extreme. She only suggests that 
bankruptcy provides certain functions at lower cost than state courts 
or markets.42 She gives us nothing except her own unvarnished opin-
ion to support her suggestions, however. Analytically, an undefended 
assumption of low bureaucratic costs is so nearly the equivalent of a 
zero-bureaucratic-cost assumption that Warren deserves credit as 
codiscoverer of ZBC analysis. 43 
40. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937) (explaining the 
existence of firms by the fact that coordination of activities in markets via contracts incurs exces-
sive transaction costs). The suggestion that bankruptcy could be seen as the mandatory creation 
of a firm with a management (trustee) and various owners (claimants) is, to my knowledge, 
originally my thought, not LoPucki's. See Bowers, supra note 39, at 2109. 
41. Cf. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 
1211, 1213-15 (1991) (explaining Coase's view of the symmetry between market and command 
structures). 
42. Warren, supra note 2, at 475-77. 
43. If either Warren or LoPucki had less disdain for economic theory, they might not have 
overlooked an obvious and simple theoretical argument for the assumption that chapter 11 in-
volves lower transaction costs than market activity would. Debtors always have the option of 
trying to work out and solve their problems in markets. To the extent that markets are cheaper 
than chapter 11, then, profit-maximizing debtors will avail themselves of market solutions. As-
suming, as is typical in economic argument, that for any input like market restructuring activity 
the marginal costs are increasing, one might predict that debtors will use markets to solve their 
illiquidity problems until the marginal cost of additional efforts in the market exceed the margi-
nal costs of employing chapter 11. Thus, voluntary chapter 1 ls will occur only when they are 
cheaper than alternative market-based solutions to the debtor's problems. Because the market is 
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The Bradley and Rosenzweig study is so troubling to LoPucki and 
Warren because Bradley and Rosenzweig's empirical data tend to call 
the ZBC assumption into question. Indeed, for publicly listed firms, 
their data supports the strict empirical observation that chapter 11 
does not operate with ZBC, at least as far as investors are concerned. 
LoPucki's transaction cost analysis, on the other hand, is not 
grounded on strict empirical observation, nor even on extended infer-
ence, but rather upon casual theorizing about the operation of mar-
kets. The transaction costs (market failures) LoPucki identifies which, 
along with an implicit ZBC assumption, he asserts justify the existence 
of chapter 11 are discussed in tum below. 
1. The Problem of !!liquidity 
The market-based alternative to chapter 11 proposed by Bradley 
and Rosenzweig# assumes that debtors in financial trouble can raise 
new capital in the market either by selling equity claims or by liquidat-
ing assets. LoPucki points out that it is costly to identify and assemble 
all the world's potential buyers, who are ready to make their best 
deals, at one place and one time so that whatever the debtor sells will 
bring in its highest values. Instead, it is cheaper to permit bidders to 
present themselves and assess potential deals with the debtor serially, 
over time, until a satisfactory bid is received. 45 A market-based alter-
native, then, will fail because, in the real world, debtors will not have 
enough time between default and foreclosure to access the serially ap-
pearing buyer market. Auctions tend to bring fire-sale, distressed 
prices. LoPucki argues that chapter 11 buys time, thus overcoming 
this market failure, and is therefore economically justifiable.46 The ar-
always available as a choice for management, the chapter 1 ls that actually occur will only be in 
cases in which command techniques cost less than market techniques; the world should never be 
troubled with chapter 1 ls in which the contrary is the case. But see Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy 
Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & EcoN. (forthcoming 1993) (arguing that market work· 
outs are likely to fail only when debtor firms or their managements insist on retaining more than 
the amount of gains resulting from the workout contract; that is, they make offers to creditors 
that will pay less than the amount to which creditors are legally entitled and can reasonably 
expect to receive absent a workout agreement; and concluding that commercial firms ought to be 
permitted to waive the protection of bankruptcy law). 
44. And the optimal liquidation scheme proposed by me as well. See Bowers, supra note 39. 
45. A transaction-cost analysis of this type may explain why, for example, people typically 
list real estate with brokers and sell it over a period of a few months rather than holding auctions. 
LoPucki does not give us any information about whether debtors-in-possession (DIPs) under 
chapter 11 ever decide either to list with brokers or to hold auctions, however. He simply as-
sumes that these two costly "market-based" techniques, used by all of us outside bankruptcy, are 
somehow cheaper or even costless when employed within a bankruptcy proceeding by a trustee 
or DIP. 
46. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 100-01. Warren seems to agree that she argues that, to the 
extent the acts necessary to obtain liquidity are out of the "ordinary," bankruptcy is intended to 
see that such acts be taken only under close court and creditor supervision. Warren, supra note 
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gument is valid, however, only if one assumes that the command 
structure proceedings which replace these otherwise costly market 
transactions are themselves costless, or, as Warren is more explicit in 
suggesting, less costly than the market alternative. Thus, by making 
this argument, LoPucki implicitly adopts the Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost 
assumption. 
His analysis makes some other illegitimate, implicit assumptions 
about the market-based proposal offered by Bradley and Rosenzweig. 
LoPucki implicitly assumes that the techniques required for dealing 
with financial distress must all be employed over a very tight 
timeframe.47 In Bradley and Rosenzweig's view, on the other hand, 
financial distress is endogenous - chosen by management. It would 
be avoidable if management constantly accessed the market, perhaps 
years in advance of any financial downturn in the firm's fortunes, so 
that fire-sale time constraints would never have to be faced.48 If cor-
porate managers carry out that function, they could buy and hold puts 
covering the firm's assets years before any financial crisis created illi-
quidity.49 Managers offered chapter 11 as an alternative to buying 
puts on the firm's assets may not buy them, however. Thus, the man-
agers themselves create the crises that require auctions instead of seri-
ally appearing buyer-market sales. 
One might object that puts for corporate assets are nearly as illiq-
2, at 475. There is some theoretical reason to conclude that illiquidity problems are not based 
exclusively on transaction costs, however. Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in 
Bankruptcy, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 367-68 (1992), argues that the desire to maximize reve-
nues can also explain the choice of an auction technique, so that illiquidity need not result exclu-
sively from market failure. 
47. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 100. 
48. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1047, 1087-88. 
49. Buying puts is not, of course, the only management strategy available in a market-based 
alternative regime to chapter 11. Management could obtain similar protection by lining up long-
term contingent lines of credit or simply by holding much of the firm's asset base in the form of 
liquid assets. In some markets, such as the market for cash, the hypothesis that transactions are 
costless is nearly true. In fact, the existence of one well-functioning market, like the market for 
cash, makes it possible for debtors to minimize their losses even when the remainder of their 
assets are traded only in costly markets. See Bowers, supra note 39, at 2129. 
Still another alternative way in which a market might deal with this problem is in the negotia-
tion of the debt contract ab initio. If the essential justification for chapter 11 is the need for a 
grace period for all debtors so that they can use the time-accessed market, debtors could bargain 
for grace periods in their debt contracts. Bankruptcy treats all debtors as if they need grace, and 
probably similar periods of it. The market, however, is likely to discriminate between those 
borrowers who need a lot of grace - and who would therefore offer to pay for the right to grace 
- and those whose assets would ordinarily be liquid anyway - and who do not have such 
critical needs for grace or whose needs are likely to be for shorter periods. The latter group is 
likely to bargain and pay for somewhat less grace. The bureaucratic chapter 11 solution, how-
ever, is likely to treat all these borrowers alike and thus to require some to pay for more grace 
than they really need while delivering less than they really need and are willing to pay for to 
others. That is a bureaucratic cost whose existence the Wisconsylvania school apparently denies 
or assumes to be trivially minimal. 
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uid as the assets themselves, thus necessitating a bureaucratic solution 
such as chapter 11. However, the fact that there is no established mar-
ket for puts for lots of corporate assets may be a result of the existence 
of chapter 11 rather than a justification for it. Markets tend to arise 
when there are needs to be served and money can be made in serving 
them. so There is thus reason to believe that repeal of chapter 11 would 
create markets through which the transaction cost of illiquidity could 
potentially be avoided. Similarly, established markets for options on 
many firms' securities already exist. Repeal of chapter 11 might cause 
them to function somewhat more actively than they do now. 
Nevertheless, LoPucki would undoubtedly say, the investment in 
puts would divert corporate resources from their current uses, and 
thus would not be costless, transactionally speaking. He would, of 
course, be correct, but the argument would not end there. The issue 
then would be: Is chapter 11 cheaper than the cost of buying the puts? 
If it were, then management would not buy them, opting instead for 
chapter 11. The key defect in the current Bankruptcy Code is that, if 
the converse is true, the debtor cannot contract out of the chapter 11 
method of dealing with the timing problem and into the cheaper put-
buying technique for doing so. Of course, this is not a serious argu-
ment to a believer in the Fantastic Wisconsylvania School, which as-
sumes that chapter 11 is always the low-cost alternative. 
The point here is that both Bradley and Rosenzweig and Warren 
and LoPucki can be right. They differ only in their estimation of the 
costs of reorganizing businesses. To the extent that neither markets 
nor bureaucracies function costlessly, both Bradley and Rosenzweig 
and Warren and LoPucki carry their arguments too far. In cases of 
doubt, probably the best solution is to permit firms to choose which 
regime they feel is least costly. Firms that believe LoPucki and War-
ren will then opt for bankruptcies; firms that believe Bradley and Ro-
senzweig will choose the market-based solution. LoPucki and Warren 
are thus right that there is no need to adopt Bradley and Rosenzweig's 
solution of repealing chapter 11. All that is necessary is to amend 
chapter 11 so that debtors can contract out of its provisions.51 
50. Indeed, chapter 11 itself spawned new markets for interests in distressed firms. See, e.g., 
Scott K. Charles, Trading Claims in Chapter 11 Cases: Legal Issues Confronting the Postpetitlon 
Investor, 1991 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 261, 261-63. 
51. For such a proposal, see Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 51 (1992). 
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2. Communication and Coordination 
a. Communications among a multitude of parties. LoPucki's 
second identified market failure is that, because there are likely to be 
many thousands of claimants with rights against the firm, transaction 
costs to adjust the affairs of all these claimants are likely to be high 
unless one assumes them away by positing a zero-transaction-cost 
world. 52 Furthermore, even worse than having too many claimants 
might be having too few. When as few as two parties must get to-
gether and negotiate, bilateral monopoly problems impose still more 
transaction costs. To avoid these difficulties, chapter 11 is justifiable, 
LoPucki argues. 53 
It is a common belief at the bar that one purpose of chapter 11 is to 
force negotiations among the throngs of people in a doomsday set-
ting. 54 It is not obvious, however, why suddenly placing all this bar-
gaining under the mantle of chapter 11 suddenly renders it costless. 55 
If management remained liquid enough, which could be done in mar-
kets as suggested above, the hundreds of simultaneous negotiations 
would not have to take place in the expensive fashion that LoPucki 
suggests the market imposes. Everybody's property rights would not 
have to be redetermined at once. Instead, only the property rights of 
those involved in the lowest priority at any time need be involved in 
the renegotiations. 56 
There are additional reasons to believe that the market offers man-
agements techniques for lowering coordination costs. For example, 
lender syndicates who offer to deal through a single representative 
52. "Direct negotiations among so many parties are unthinkable." LoPucki, supra note 2, at 
101-02. "[Chapter 11] provides a forum for negotiating deals ... [which] help[s] to reduce 
transaction costs •.. that exist in the real world between a troubled company and the thousands 
of entities with which it conducts its business." Warren, supra note 2, at 475. 
53. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 102 n.87: "Chapter 11 would be necessary to impose on 
irrational parties the deals they should have made." 
54. See, e.g., J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 229-41 
(1991); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 717, 775 (1991). 
55. LoPucki explains that, under chapter 11, bargainers are forced to bargain in large, inter-
mediated groups. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 101. This cuts down the number of bargains that 
must be struck, but it still remains unclear why or to what extent it is cheaper to make people 
bargain through agents they did not want to appoint than to let the market mediate. If increas-
ing the amount of bargaining was a goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act revisions, then Bradley and 
Rosenzweig's data allows us to make the strict empirical observation that bargaining through 
involuntary agents is not the least costly way to do it as far as investors are concerned. 
56. LoPucki has recently argued that uncertainty about the value of the insolvent firm is 
normally sufficiently large to cut across more than one legal priority level. Lynn M. LoPucki & 
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly 
Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 771-76 (1993). If the value uncertainties cannot be 
resolved in debt contracts, it would follow that renegotiation might have to occur with the bot-
tom priorities rather than the bottom priority. 
1788 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1773 
would offer competitive advantages to syndicate members over other 
lenders who insisted on dealing individually. Debt contracts could 
then be struck in a market-based alternative to chapter 11 in ways that 
minimize these coordination costs. 
In a world that still has a nonwaivable chapter 11, however, the 
competitive advantage of lenders who join in syndicates is nullified. 
Lenders in such a world will deal with debtors on an individual basis; 
thus, individual lenders, not syndicates, will be found in whatever 
chapter 1 ls are brought. If lenders deal individually, the costs of ne-
gotiation are raised in the chapter 1 ls by the costs of forcing the indi-
vidual claimants to deal through representatives different from those 
they would have contractually selected. The existence of loan partici-
pations and indenture trustees for bond issues is some evidence that 
the market is sensitive to, and capable of taking steps to reduce, coor-
dination and negotiation costs. The existence of such costs does not 
imply that the market solution is inferior to the bureaucratic solution 
unless the ZBC assumption is somehow more justifiable than the ZTC 
assumption. 
b. Coordination among a multitude of substantive rights. Per-
haps, as LoPucki suggests, property rights might arise by contract 
with debtor firms which conflict with each other. I suppose it also 
sometimes happens that the descriptions of dairy farm boundaries get 
fouled up in Wisconsin so that occasionally two farmers both believe 
they own that same strip along the back road. By and large, it is prob-
ably a fair guess that the market contract system, under which farms 
are bought, sold, mortgaged, and so forth, does a pretty good job of 
coordinating old MacDonald's boundary line with Farmer Brown's. 
It is far from obvious, however, whether a chapter 11, which brings 
the two farmers and all their uncles and cousins into litigation with 
each other, is necessary to resolve boundary disputes, something 
nonbankruptcy courts have _been doing for some time now. On the 
other hand, if bankruptcy courts can resolve boundary disputes at zero 
costs, perhaps they ought to be reconstituted into central economic 
planning agencies. Because they operate costlessly, by LoPucki's and 
Warren's lights, they might be justified as necessary to coordinate eve-
rybody's property rights all of the time. 
3. Relief from Contractual Default Provisions 
Unlike the problem of serially time-accessed markets and the prob-
lem of coordination and negotiation, this function supposedly served 
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by chapter 1157 does not involve avoidance of transaction costs. 
Rather, the blurring of rights that occurs when courts do not decide in 
advance which contract clauses to enforce and which not to enforce 
creates transaction costs. However, if there are weaknesses in the 
common law of contract that lead us to believe that the courts should 
not enforce draconian default clauses, the solution is not to add to the 
number of preexisting transaction costs out there in the world. 
Rather, it is to propose and adopt a federal law of contract that will 
override the inefficient state doctrines that enforce those draconian 
clauses. Achieving this solution, however, requires a theory to distin-
guish between worthwhile default clauses and objectionable ones. 
It is questionable whether bankruptcy law is a rational response to 
an imperfection in a small part of the common law of contract that 
permits objectionable default clauses to be enforced. LoPucki has not 
even suggested that a theory which sorts good default clauses from 
bad ones has emerged in the bankruptcy process. Since the theory has 
not yet even been identified, it has not yet been defended. It is prema-
ture, in the absence of such a theory and its defense, to conclude that 
contracts should not be enforced as they are negotiated, much less that 
the adoption of chapter 11 is the best technique for applying the social 
decision not to enforce them. 
4. Soft Landings for Managers and Shareholders 
LoPucki's final apology for chapter 11 is that it is needed to elimi-
nate managers who are unwilling to be fired and shareholders who will 
not admit that their interest in bankrupt firms has evaporated. In 
making this assertion he does not identify what transaction costs pre-
vent market adjustment of these contractual relationships, nor does he 
specify the alternative sorts of extra costs that might be incurred if the 
enforcement of market contracts replaced chapter 11 as a mechanism 
for the removal of management and shareholders. 58 Because LoPucki 
does not indicate the particular transaction costs that dictate a bureau-
cratic rather than a market-based solution to these problems, it is hard 
to believe that he offers this argument seriously.59 
57. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 103-04. 
58. Nor does he deal with the cases in which firms have actually contracted for changes of 
management control in the real world and have honored those contracts outside of bankruptcy. 
See, e.g., Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975). 
59. It may be, for example, that the current state-created common law of contract is deficient 
in the remedies it provides against recalcitrant managers and shareholders. It remains to be 
explained, however, why revision of the contract law is not likely to bring about a cheaper solu-
tion than is the adoption of a bankruptcy code. 
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III. SEARCHING UNDER THE STREETLAMP 
Were Bradley and Rosenzweig satisfied that bureaucratic solutions 
to commercial problems were indeed costless, they probably would 
also agree with LoPucki and Warren that chapter 11, in concept at 
least, is a monument to human aspirations. 60 LoPucki, on the other 
hand, extravagantly concedes that, in a world of zero market costs, 
chapter 11 would be a colossal mistake. 61 If I am right, the issue be-
tween those of us who rely on economic analysis to criticize bank-
ruptcy law and those who, like LoPucki, think our work is screwball 
is, as Bradley and Rosenzweig concede, 62 a question of how well our 
real markets actually work. 63 The symmetrical question would be, 
"Well, how well do those bureaucrats really function?" That is the 
question Bradley and Rosenzweig sought to answer, and their answer 
is that the bureaucrats impose a lot of costs on corporate investors. 64 
Is there any reason to believe that real market costs are sufficiently 
low to make them an attractive solution to the creditors' remedy prob-
lem? I believe there is. LoPucki is scathingly critical of Bradley and 
Rosenzweig for their use of stock and bond market data. He accuses 
them of warping the questions they study by reason of the availability 
of the data, much like the person who lost his key somewhere else on 
the block but conducts his search under the streetlamp because the 
light is better there. 65 
His critique is telling because the best evidence about whether mar-
ket transaction costs are lower or higher than bankruptcy bureaucratic 
costs would be whether and when firms choose one or the other route. 
60. Indeed, if the world had perfect bureaucrats, the common law of property, contract, and 
tort would be unnecessary. The perfect bureaucrats would simply appropriately parcel out the 
world's resources to whomever would hold and use them most efficiently. There would thus 
never be any need for any markets, and talking about market-based solutions to problems would 
be nonsensical. 
61. "It should be apparent by now that Bradley and Rosenzweig are correct in their conclu-
sion that there is no need for court-supervised reorganization in a world without transaction 
costs. A perfect market would be a perfect substitute for chapter 11; in a PM-ZTC world, chap-
ter 11 should be repealed." LoPucki, supra note 2, at 106. 
62. "The relevance or applicability of the perfect markets solution to the real world depends 
on the efficiency of the pertinent real-world markets." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 
1054. 
63. LoPucki seems willing to assume that markets actually work pretty well if doing so will 
help him score a debating point. For example, LoPucki posits certain facts about how highly 
leveraged the firms that Bradley and Rosenzweig studied were, and then he uses the assumption 
of a well-functioning market to reinterpret their findings in a way contrary to their interpretation 
of the same data. If a belief in the efficiency of the market was necessary in order to argue that 
the Bradley and Rosenzweig findings were in error, LoPucki seems to have no trouble holding 
the belief. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 89. 
64. This assumes that the reader is willing to accept that extended inferences are valid. See 
supra Part I.A. 
65. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 85-86. 
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There may be many firms which have reorganized or liquidated by 
using the market, and these firms might have different characteristics 
from those choosing chapter 11. Accordingly, the worthwhile cases to 
study might be the cases of those firms who suffered economic hard-
ships or serious business downturns and yet relied on their market-
based options to weather the storm. Bradley and Rosenzweig instead 
limit their study to firms which chose bankruptcy because they were 
easy to identify. 
The firms which used the market-based techniques are hard to 
identify, so I believe that LoPucki is right in charging Bradley and 
Rosenzweig with looking only under the lamp. The interesting issue is 
that LoPucki himself, although presumably funded by a substantial 
government grant, 66 chose to search only under the same lamp. His 
own empirical studies are limited to firms which chose the bureau-
cratic alternative. 67 It is rather remarkable that purportedly believing 
only in conclusions reached through strict empirical observation, and 
having studied only the bureaucratic alternative, LoPucki holds such 
strong opinions about the impracticality of the other options. 
LoPucki's conclusions are the inevitable consequence of his uncritical 
acceptance of his Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost 
assumption. 68 
My empirical hunch is that the claimholders of the firms who 
chose to cope with difficulty by using the market are better off than the 
claimholders of the firms that did not. I defend this hunch by observ-
ing that even believers in the ZBC hypothesis like LoPucki and War-
ren are not yet advocating a bureaucratic alternative to the problems 
of those businesses that face the same transaction costs faced by de-
clining businesses. People who put businesses together and make them 
grow, for example, have to enter the same serially accessed markets 
LoPucki and Warren decry as expensive in order to build their busi-
66. See id. at 86 n.22. 
67. Cf. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 20. 
68. It is even plausible to suggest that the first response of firms to incipient insolvency might 
not be to file a chapter 11 petition, but rather to resort to some market-based type of response to 
the potential trouble, perhaps by partially liquidating their most liquid assets. Indeed, were he 
not to disdain theOl'}"SO strongly, LoPucki could have cited a model which suggests that the only 
assets left to be liquidated and distributed for firms undergoing financial crises are likely to be 
those which trade only in markets with high transaction costs or which are highly specialized, 
and thus have a lot more value to the debtor than to the markets. See Bowers, supra note 39, at 
2120-28, for such a theoretical model. LoPucki dismisses that analysis as just another of those 
studies using economic reasoning which are not worth examining closely, however. See LoPucki, 
supra note 2, at 79 n.2. He does not point out any findings from his own studies that indicate 
what managements' prebankruptcy responses were to their financial crises. Such suggestions, 
even if they might have advanced his argument, would nevertheless seem unimportant to a be-
liever in the existence of a perfect bureaucratic solution. 
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nesses. How much better would be a costlessly operating central plan-
ning agency that forced all resources to be registered in a central data 
bank so that the planners could direct, by fiat, those possessing assets 
to deliver them to the business-builders! All those millions of con-
tracts, which require individual negotiation and coordination and 
which LoPucki and Warren say raise prospects of hopelessly high 
transaction costs, have been initially negotiated and coordinated in 
markets in the case of every firm ever entering chapter 11. If bureau-
cratic solutions are costless, it is surprising that there is no apparent 
demand that they be used to replace the costly markets people use for 
building businesses. No obvious a priori reason exists to believe that 
there would be bureaucratic costs of putting businesses together that 
are unavoidable when the bureaucratic costs of taking the structures of 
businesses apart and reorganizing them are nil. 
During the past seventy-five years, the efficiency of bureaucratic 
solutions to the problems posed by transaction costs was extensively 
experimented with throughout Eastern Europe. That experience vali-
dates hunches like mine: bureaucratic solutions are far from costless. 
Markets seem to work well enough, despite their imperfections, to put 
businesses together. That, it seems to me, is enough to justify my be-
lief that markets also ought to be permitted to take them apart. 
